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Introduction
This paper examines the possibility of reducing moral hazard and adverse selection in automobile insurance markets when the behavior of the insureds, which is related to the risk of accident, can ex post be observed or when the risk type can be revealed to the insurer before he pays the coverage. This research is motivated by the fast progress in automobile electronics engineering in recent years, which is, among other things, reflected in increasing performance and decreasing costs of the constituting electronic parts.
1 Above all, this trend is manifested through improved sensors which are already fession, date of issue of the driving license, make of car, declared mileage. The very nature of these data implies a rather imprecise calculation of individual risk which can lead to very heterogeneous risk classes and from the viewpoint of the insured -to a very unfair categorization. 11 Another way of dealing with asymmetric information is the yearly adjustment of the insurance premiums according to past accidents which serves to set incentives for safer driving on the one hand and on the other hand it corresponds to the continuous revelation of risk type to the insurer with time. The disadvantages of premium adjustment lie in the long period of time needed in order to find out the risk type of a given driver and the fact that good risks are "penalized" with a higher premium in the same way as bad risks when they report an accident.
If the predictions about the future technological development are correct, and given that even today black boxes are increasingly often built into vehicles by automobile producers, 12 one can pose the question if and how insurers will make use of black boxes for designing insurance contracts and what consequences this will have for the insureds and for social welfare. From the literature on information theory the second-best contracts which are established under asymmetric information are known to be self-selecting under adverse selection and an incentive compatible contract under moral hazard. We examine a setting in which the insurer has the technical opportunity of offering in addition to the second-best contracts an optional contract with ex post revelation of perfect information which only takes place when an accident has occurred. With the insureds having the right to choose among all these alternative contracts the question arises, which contracts will finally persist in equilibrium in the market and what implications this will have for insureds, insurers and total welfare. We analyze these problems for moral hazard and adverse selection separately as well as both for perfect competitive and monopolistic markets. Another important issue which we address is how privacy concerns, when taken into account, will affect our results.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the general setting of the insurance model. Section 3 deals with the problem of adverse selection under perfect competition. First, we look at the referential situation when risk type is public information (3.1). Then the situation with risk type being private information and the resulting loss of social welfare is discussed (3.2). Finally, the situation in which insurers are able to offer contracts that include a clause for contingent accession to the black box is analyzed (3.3). Since, in this context, the problem of privacy loss becomes of considerable 11 For a detailed discussion on imperfect categorization see Hoy (1992, 322) .
12 E.g. Newstarget network; Spiegel -Online.
concern, we discuss possible reasons for and the consequences of having an aversion against the revelation of privacy (3.4). Adverse selection under monopoly is discussed in section 4 basically following the same pattern of thought as the previous section. Then the problem of moral hazard is briefly presented in the same framework, assuming monopoly first in section 5, and then assuming perfect competition in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
General setting of the model
The purpose of the model is to present the negative social effect of asymmetric information as is commonly known from the information literature and then, under the assumption that a black box reveals perfect information, to show that the first-best situation as with symmetric information can be restored if the insurer is able to include a clause in the contract, which allows him to access the black box after an accident has occurred and use the information to infer on the risk of the particular insured. In terms of adverse selection this would mean that the review of the data would reveal some characteristics related to the risk type of the insured like concentration, the quickness of reactions, or the driving competence as a whole. Concerning the problem of moral hazard the black box could disclose some evidence on the exerted effort contributing to a reduced risk of accident. Specifically it is assumed that a black box reveals perfect information about the risk type of the driver and about his behavior respectively, and that no costs are incurred thereby. The insurers are risk-neutral and all drivers are risk-averse with the same utility function, constant absolute risk aversion and an initial wealth of W . The possible damage is denoted by L , with W L > . A particular insurance contract is described by the insurance premium r and the coverage d . It is also assumed that if the insureds are indifferent between two contracts they take that one which is preferred by the insurer.
The possibility of offering different levels of coverage is justified when looking at the automobile insurance markets: even though the leeway of insurers is restricted through a regulation which prescribes a minimum coverage in third party liability insurance, firms do offer an alternative higher one, and in comprehensive insurance there are often several deductibles from which the insured can choose. Concerning the freedom of setting the insurance premiums there are no legal restrictions since the deregulation in 1994. Insurance premium adjustments, which would require a multi-period dynamic analysis, are completely ignored, but for the purpose of the model this should not be crucial. Another feature which is neglected in the model is the legal obligation to enter into a contract. If accounted for in the model, this regulation would mainly afflict the insured, since a given insurer may still get rid of a particular bad risk very quickly whereas a customer would get with each insurer nearly the same conditions. 13 The alternative to insurance then would not be to drive without insurance, but to forego the possession of an own vehicle which would change the reservation utility. Still, for the conclusions of the model this is immaterial.
Adverse selection under perfect competition
When concentrating on the two contract variables mentioned above ( , ) d r (and thus ignoring the fact that insurers differentiate through various additional services) and considering the great number of firms in the market for automobile insurance, the assumption of perfect competition seems an appropriate one. Further it is assumed that there are two risk types of drivers -low risk (L) and high risk (H) with probability of accident (0,1)
H L p p > . All drivers know their own risk type with certainty. The proportion of the low risks in the population is q and all drivers have the utility function ( ) u w .
Symmetric information
In the referential situation with risk type being public information the optimal contracts are obtained with the insureds, each risk type separately, maximizing their expected utility under the zero-profit constraint of the insurers. The maximization problem for each risk type is therefore:
The resulting contracts are ( , ) ( , )
The indemnity covers the whole loss, so that the risk-neutral insurers take on the whole risk and for this the insureds pay the actuarially fair premium corresponding to their individual risk. These contracts are Pareto-optimal. In the state-preference diagram (see Fig. 1 ) the axes represent the net wealth in case of an accident (A) and in case of no accident (NA). P O represents the contingent wealth position without insurance. The optimal contracts are found as the tangency points between the indifference curves of the insureds and the respective zero-profit lines of the insurers with slopes corresponding to the accident probabilities (1 ) / i i p p − − . As can be seen, these tangency points lie on the certainty line of the insureds meaning complete insurance.
Asymmetric information
In case that the risk type is private information the contract set just found cannot persist, since the high risks will choose the contract designed for the low risks, thus leading to negative profits.
The equilibrium contracts under perfect competition and asymmetric information may differ depending on which equilibrium concept is chosen. For the Rothschild / Stiglitz (1976) equilibrium (denoted as RS) it is assumed that firms follow pure Nash-strategies with each firm considering the behavior of its rivals as fixed and making its own decisions without anticipating any reactions of the other firms. As a consequence of this assumption, a contract set can constitute an equilibrium, only if every single contract earns zero profits. With that no cross-subsidization from low risks to high risks is possible.
14 Another consequence is that a pooling equilibrium cannot exist. 15 It can be shown that for every given pooling contract P C there is another contract T C , which will be 14 See Rothschild / Stigtlitz (1976, 643 f.) for an explanation.
15 Rothschild / Stiglitz (1976, 634 f.) .
preferred by the low risks, rejected by the high risks and earn strictly positive profits for the insurer if offered, which means that P C cannot be an equilibrium. 16 Hence, if there is an equilibrium, it must be a separating one.
In order to determine the optimal contracts under asymmetric information the firm has to ensure that the high risks will not choose the contract for the low risks. The reverse will not happen, since low risks are strictly worse off when choosing the first-best contract for high risks HK C . So HK C will remain in the equilibrium set. 17 The contract for the low risks is determined by adding a self-selection constraint for the high risk type H
to the maximization problem (1) for i L = . Both constraints are binding so that graphically the optimal contract LA C is found as the intersection between the low-risk zeroprofit line and the high-risk indifference curve passing through HK C (see Fig. 1 ). High risks are no worse off under asymmetric information while low risks buy only partial insurance and therefore suffer a loss of utility. Hence, the information asymmetry causes a loss of welfare.
A separating equilibrium may not exist under the assumptions made. Intuitively this may be the case when an imaginary alternative pooling contract seems relatively attractive. According to Rothschild / Stiglitz (1976, 637) this applies when high risks are too few, or if the probabilities of accident are only weakly apart, or if the risk aversion of the insureds is too high. A smaller proportion of high risks corresponds to lower costs of pooling to the low risks -with an imaginary pooling contract they would have to subsidize only a few high risks. The same is true for just weakly differing probabilities of accident which would imply relatively low subsidies per high risk. Finally, higher risk aversion implies higher costs for the low risk type of partially taking over the risk and hence higher costs of self-selection.
Since an equilibrium may not always exist on the one hand and on the other hand, since the assumptions made do not allow for cross-subsidization from low risks to high risks, 16 Rothschild / Stiglitz (1976, 633) define equilibrium as a set of contracts such that, when the insureds choose among them to maximize expected utility "(i) no contract in the equilibrium set makes negative expected profits; and (ii) there is no contract outside the equilibrium set that, if offered, will make nonnegative profits". 17 It can be shown that a self-selection constraint for type L is not binding so that the maximization problem for the high risk corresponds to the public information case (1). (see i.e. Dionne / Doherty / Fombaron (2000, 206-208) HS L S C C in the latter case is depicted in Fig. 2 . In this figure, even though a RS equilibrium exists (the pooled zero-profit line 0 P π = does not cut the low-risk indifference curve through LA C ), the social welfare is improved through moving from the RS equilibrium to the cross-subsidizing contracts: the insurers still have zero total profits, but both high and low risks get on higher indifference curves. Hence, in this case the RS equilibrium is not "second-best efficient". According to Dionne / Doherty / Fombaron (2000, 212) Rothschild / Stiglitz (1976, 644) derive the critical value (1 ) WMS q − from the optimal subsidy problem:
For his empirical research of the French automobile insurance market Dionne (2001, 20) , for instance, considers cross-subsidization from low to high risks as a characteristic of this market. In contrast, Puelz / Snow (1994) find that there is no such cross-subsidization. 19 See Dionne / Doherty / Fombaron (2000, 209-212) . Specifically the firms are assumed to have "Wilson foresight" which means that "no firm will offer one or more contracts that, although initially earning nonnegative profits, will cause other firms to withdraw their policies, with the result that the initial firm earns negative profits" (Hoy (1982, 322) ). 20 Crocker / Snow (1985, 213) . 21 "An allocation is second-best efficient if it is Pareto-optimal within the set of allocations that are feasible and the zero-profit constraint on the portfolio" (Dionne / Doherty / Fombaron (2000, 211) ). 22 See also Crocker / Snow (1985, 213) .
is the "tax" that each low risk has to pay and s is the subsidy that each high risk receives. If the constraint 0 s ≥ is binding, then the second-best efficient contract set is the RS equilibrium without subsidy and in this case it holds:
Formally the optimal contracts in Fig. 2 can also be found by maximizing the expected utility of the low-risks under the incentive compatibility constraint of the high risks and the zero-total-profit constraint 23 :
The outcome is full insurance for high risks with a better than fair premium. Compared to the RS equilibrium low risks have to pay more than their fair premium but they receive a greater coverage now, which eventually makes them better off. See Crocker / Snow (1985, 209-211) .
Contract with a clause for black box accession
Now it is assumed that the insurer has the possibility of offering a contract that permits him accession to the data collected by the black box, provided that an accident has occurred, and that he hereby obtains perfect information about the risk type of the particular driver. If an accident does not occur, the insurer cannot know what risk type has taken the contract, hence he can differentiate only through the indemnity he pays after the accident, but not through the insurance premium. Starting with the RS equilibrium, it is obvious that the good risks, who are made worse off by the information asymmetry, would be willing to reveal their risk type if they were given a chance to do so. Therefore, the insurer can now offer a contract including the clause for contingent accession to the black box BB C , which is intended for low risks and corresponds to their first-best contract LK C , i.e. it offers full coverage, but this is only paid after the insurer verifies that the driver is really a low risk. Concerning the bad risks, the insurer has to prevent their preferring this contract BB C to their first-best contract HK C . This is achieved by determining the coverage
, in case that the driver turns out to be a high risk in such a way, that it satisfies the new self-selecting constraint of the high risk type: C C . It also follows that under the assumptions made, verification in that state only, in which the claim against the insurer arises, is sufficient, thus making continuous observation of driving behavior unnecessary.
The situation is a little bit different when considering a WMS equilibrium with cross subsidization. As can be seen in Fig. 2 bad risks are better off with the information asymmetry than with their first-best contract. So, they would resist to the introduction of the contract with a check-up, if they had some influence on that. However, the assumption, that firms possess Wilson's foresight, which is actually the prerequisite for a WMS equilibrium, and the assumption that the black box reveals perfect information, imply that equilibrium contracts will evolve to the first-best contracts Fig. 2 only
is depicted), with which total profits are just equal to zero. Again the indemnity
in case that a high risk takes the contract with the stipulated accession to the black box must be determined such that high risks continue choosing HS C . In this way high risks are no worse off than with asymmetric information. The insurers still make zero total profits. 25 Low risks indeed continue subsidizing high risks, yet they are better off because of receiving complete insurance now.
One can ascertain, that this contract set will not be an equilibrium under the assumptions made, since there exists another contract set (e.g. , What has just been shown to be Pareto-improving contracts is already applied in practice. Progressive Insurance Corp. offers alternatively to its former contracts a new contract including the so-called "TripSensor". With this device insureds can collect data about their driving behavior and submit it periodically to the insurer. Progressive promises, that regardless of how unfavorable the submitted data are, only premium decreases (in the range of 5-25%) are possible after signing the TripSense contract. Insofar, provided that this promise is really held, these contract conditions are not a good example in support of the WMS equilibrium, implying that there is either no cross-subsidization 24 See Hoy (1982, pp. 331-336) for an analysis of WMS equilibria when imperfect information on risk type is available to insurers. 25 As can be seen in Fig. 2 
Privacy
The very thought of using black boxes inevitably raises the question of privacy. There might be two prominent reasons for insureds to dislike being observed: the first reason might be the intrinsic disutility from revealing personal data and the second reason the utility loss related to premium risk. The considerations below pertain to the RS equilibrium.
Concerning the first reason, one can imagine that the disutility from the revelation of personal data is an additional component ( ) g BB to the already existing utility function ( ) u w which is subtracted from it in case that the black box is reviewed. It is assumed that some proportion k of the low risks (denoted below as k -type low risks) suffers such a disutility when personal data are revealed. Thus, a utility function of ( , ) ( ) ( ) U w BB u w g BB = − is generated in this state of nature. Further it is assumed that the rest of low risks (denoted below as (1 ) k − -type low risks) don not mind being observed: their utility function remains ( ) u w whether or not a black box is used, i.e., it is completely independent of the application of a black box per se. One can easily ascertain that (i) the contract set HK C and BB C resulting in 3.3 (see Fig. 1 ) will persist, if the k -type low risks still prefer
LA
C and BB C will persist in equilibrium, if the disutility from the revelation of data is so high, that k -type low risks prefer the second-best contract, that is if
Indeed, if k -type low risks choose the contract including the clause for contingent accession to the black box, they will suffer an expected disutility from the revelation of personal data per se amounting to ( )
, since only in case that an accident occurs (with a probability of L p ) the review of the black box and the disutility following from this ( ) g BB − will take place. At the same time, however, this contract with contingent accession to the black box in effect results in the first-best contract LK C offering full insurance and therefore, as was formerly shown, a higher expected utility. Therefore, k -type low risks have to trade off these two effects. In the former case the additional expected utility from having complete insurance is sufficiently high in order to compensate the expected disutility from revealing personal data. Thus, besides the (1 ) k − -type low risks, for whom nothing has changed compared to 3.3, k -type low risks will also choose the contract BB C . As before, high risks take their first-best contract HK C . In contrast, in the latter case the expected disutility ( )
is so high, that it outweighs the benefits from receiving complete insurance. Hence it restrains the k -type low risks from choosing the contract with contingent accession to the black box. They prefer the second-best contract LA C . Of course, (1 ) k − -type low risks continue preferring BB C and high risks HK C , so that in this case the equilibrium set consists of all three contracts.
It follows that, unless there are only k -type low risks in the population ( 1 k = ) who, in addition, suffer such a great disutility from the revelation of personal data, that they prefer the second-best contract (i.e.
, there will always be a Pareto-improvement of social welfare, when a contract with contingent accession to the black box BB C is offered. In other words, if there is just one low risk who eventually prefers this contract, the total effect on social welfare will be positive.
Premium (or classification) risk arises when the insured does not know his own risk type with certainty and, by agreeing to a check-up, incurs the additional risk (i.e. apart from the risk of accident) of turning out to be one of either types, i.e. the risk of being charged a higher premium if the outcome is "high risk type". There is plenty of literature on risk categorization, which is often related to genetic testing in health insurance. For instance it is shown that the social and private (i.e. to the insureds) value of costless additional information on risk type is negative if it is public 27 or if it is private with insurers, however, being able to observe the information status of the agents 28 . Here it is not the objective to provide an overview of the theory on risk classification. 29 Just an exemplary possible case will be presented in order to demonstrate, that in the presence of uncertainty about risk type, the readiness of the customers to choose the contract with a clause for contingent accession to the black box might be reduced.
27 Doherty / Posey (1998, pp. 194-196) .
28 Doherty / Thistle (1996, 85, 88) . 29 The articles on this topic analyze various scenarios depending on whether the additional information that can be obtained is public or private, whether the insurers can observe the information status of the agents, whether the agents can decide if to reveal the contents of the additional information, whether they have a priori knowledge concerning their risk type etc. (see e.g. Crocker / Snow (2000), Crocker / Snow (1992), Crocker / Snow (1986), Hoy (1982) , Doherty / Thistle (1996) , Doherty / Posey (1998)).
It is assumed that there are informed low risks (L), informed high risks (H) and uninformed people (U). It is common knowledge that the uninformed might be good risk with a probability of q . From the viewpoint of the insurers there are three types of drivers, so that the equilibrium contracts, provided that equilibrium exists, are Fig. 3 ) with the self-selecting constraints holding for type H:
and for type U: 
] since now they have to differentiate from both H and U risk types by partially assuming the risk of accident. Now, the insurer who considers offering contracts with contingent accession to the black box has two alternative choices: the first one is to offer such a contract that is originally intended only for low risks. The contract from 3. , if high risk ) will not discourage the uninformed from choosing it since in comparison to the high risk drivers they still have a chance of turning out to be low risks, hence there is a greater probability of the better outcome ( )
Since their taking the contract from 3.3 would imply a loss to the insurer, a stronger self-selecting constraint for the uninformed must be set. Hence, the corresponding coverage must satisfy:
So the indemnity necessary to just prevent both uninformed (U) and informed high risks (H) from choosing the contract with black box will be
30 Thus, uninformed drivers will remain so and only the low risks will agree to a contract with contingent accession to the black box.
The second alternative to the insurer, provided that competitive pressure will cause the contract offered ' BB C to end up in the contingent wealth position LK C (with the insurance premium L p L ⋅ ) for informed low risks, would simply be to set the indemnity for the case that the driver turns out to be a high risk in a way that ensures zero-profits, no matter if informed high risks or uninformed take the contract. In Fig. 3 this implies the wealth position
⋅ contingent on the driver's turning out to be a high risk. All low risks (L) will choose the contract with contingent accession to the black box; all high risks (H) will deny it. The question is, what the uninformed (U) drivers will do. Following the model of Doherty / Thistle (1996, 92 f.), it is assumed first, that all insurers expect the uninformed to become informed (i.e., to choose the contract with contingent accession to the black box). In this case they will offer the contract set
Should the uninformed really get informed, then they will have an expected utility of
If they, in contrast, deny the contract ' BB C , i.e. decide to remain uninformed, they will either have to take the contract
HK C
with an expected utility of ( ) ( )
or remain without insurance with the reservation utility
Therefore, the value of the additional information, i.e. the value to the uninformed driver of choosing the contract with contingent accession to the black box, is:
Only if this is positive ( * 0 I > ), will the uninformed choose the contract with the clause for contingent accession to the black box.
If the insurers expect the uninformed not to get informed, they will offer the contract set 
which is, after some transformation, equivalent to
Should this be positive, i.e.,
then the uninformed drivers will choose to get informed and take the contract with contingent accession to the black box, so that in this case the contract set
cannot be an equilibrium.
, respectively], it follows from (10) [and (11) , respectively] and (12) that ** * I I < . Only if 0 ** * I I < < , will the uninformed drivers choose to get informed, so that the equilibrium contracts will be HK C and ' BB C . If ** * 0 I I < < , the uninformed will deny the contract with contingent accession to the black box so that the equilibrium contract set will be As can be seen, due to the classification risk, a contract with contingent accession to the black box is not automatically attractive to uninformed customers. Under certain circumstances the uninformed drivers will prefer to remain so.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of the black-box contract into the set of contracts makes no one worse off, but at the same time makes informed low risks (L) better off. Hence, since the clause for contingent accession to the black box gives low risks the opportunity to directly signal their risk type to the insurer without the necessity of taking over any risk, welfare is Pareto-improved.
Adverse selection under monopoly 31

Symmetric information
In contrast to perfect competition this time the monopolist skims off the whole surplus of the contractual relationship so that the insureds just receive their reservation utility
When risk type is public information the optimal contracts are found with the insurer maximizing his expected profit subject to the participation constraint of the insured:
The resulting contracts * z . This is also the risk premium of type i that he is willing to forego in order to move from the state without insurance P O to complete insurance in * i C (see Fig. 4 ). As can be seen in the figure, the indifference curves corresponding to the reservation utility pass through the state without insurance P O , and * i C are the certainty equivalents on these curves.
Asymmetric Information
When risk type is private information the insurer will not offer the first-best contracts any more, since both low and high risks will choose * L C , thus significantly reducing profits. Stiglitz (1977, 417-421) shows that the insurer will either offer self-selecting contracts, or he will offer an insurance contract only to the high risks, letting low risks uninsured.
32 Unlike the situation with perfect competition the exact position of the selfselecting contracts -if they exist -depends on the proportions of risk types. In order to determine these second-best contracts ** H C and ** L C , the monopolist has to reduce the indemnity paid on the low risk contract so that it becomes unattractive to high risks. Formally this is accomplished through maximizing the total expected profit, subject to the participation constraints and the incentive compatibility constraints of both risk types:
It can be shown that the participation constraint of the high risks (IR-H) is not binding (they get more than just reservation utility) and that it can be derived from the participation constraint of the low risks (IR-L) and the high risk incentive-compatibilityconstraint (IC-H). Moreover, the low risk incentive-compatibility constraint (IC-L) is not binding so that the problem reduces to (16) 
The resulting contracts ** H C and ** L C are depicted in Fig. 4 , with ** L C implying partial insurance of low risks. The profit with high risks is reduced compared to the situation with symmetric information, but this is simply redistribution from the monopolist to the insureds: they now get some consumer surplus. In contrast, the monopolist's profit with low risks is reduced too, but they still just get their reservation utility. This is due to the suboptimal risk-allocation now with low risks demanding compensation for partially incurring the risk of accident, which eventually reduces the profit of the insurer. Hence the situation leads to loss of social welfare compared to the situation with symmetric information.
The same is true in case that there is no insurance of low risks 33 . As is shown by Stiglitz (1977, 421) , there is a critical value for the proportion of high risks to low risks which, if exceeded, means that there is no separating equilibrium with high risks getting their first-best contract and low risks remaining without insurance, i.e., if
[ ]
Clearly there is a loss of social welfare compared to the reference situation: both risk types have their reservation utility, the monopolist, however, has to forego his profit with low risks.
Contract with a clause for black box accession
In an analogous manner as with perfect competition the first-best situation can be restored, if it is possible for the insurer to include a condition, which permits him accession to the black box after an accident has occurred. Here too, the insurer can offer in addition to the first-best contract for high risks * C . In this case the wealth position for high risks which is required to just discourage them from choosing the black box contract will be ' Fig. 4 . Thus, the monopolist will increase his profits with low risks only, while both low and high risks will be made no worse off. This means a Pareto-type improvement of social welfare.
Privacy
Finally the question shall be addressed, what the outcome would look like, if there were a proportion k of low risks -denoted as k -type low risks -who dislike the disclosure of private information per se and suffer a disutility of ( ) g BB − if this happens. For this purpose the corresponding assumptions which were made in the case of perfect competition apply. k -type low risks will never take the contract BB C , since with it they would have less than reservation utility. Therefore the monopolist has basically three possibilities 34 : (i) to offer * H C for high risks and a contract with contingent accession to the black box high risks, has to be derived so that it meets the incentive compatibility constraint of high risks. Below this is not mentioned explicitly. type and (1 ) k − -type low risks. This contract can be designed so that it just meets the participation constraint of k -type low risks. Such a contract could be for instance Fig. 4 (ii) to offer a pair of self-selecting contracts for high risks which is in fact a special case of (ii).
(ii) In presence of an alternative contract with contingent accession to the black box, the existence of k -type low risks will alter the position of the originally found selfselecting contract set ( **, **)
L H C C , since the particular self-selecting contracts depend on the proportions of risk types. The proportion of insureds who will now take the self-selecting contract with partial insurance is reduced from q to q k ⋅ , since (1 ) k − -type low risks, who do not mind the disclosure of privacy, will prefer the contract with black box accession which results for them in the wealth position * L C . Thus the proportion q k ⋅ has to be inserted for q in problem (16) in order to determine the new selfselecting contract set ( **, **)
. Accordingly, the optimality condition (17) also changes and so does the critical value (18). Then, provided that the proportions of risk types are such that (20) [ ]
holds, k -type low risks will remain without insurance (iii) and the contracts offered will be * 
Of course, this also means that (1 ) k − -type low risks will receive strictly more than their reservation utility. The monopolist will make a profit strictly less than in the referential situation in which he knows the risk types from the outset. Still, the total profit of the monopolist might be increased compared to a situation when the contract with contingent accession to the black box is offered to k -type low risks only. In which one of both alternatives (i) or (ii) the insurer's profit will be higher depends on the particular proportion k and on the dimension of the disutility ( ) g BB − caused by the implementation of a black box.
35
Concerning social welfare the same arguments can be put forward as in the case of perfect competition and the WMS subsidizing equilibrium. Even if there are some insureds, who dislike the loss of privacy, there is a Pareto-type improvement of welfare when a contract with contingent accession to the black box is offered, as long as high risks are not made worse off than without it, i.e. as long as the monopolist is forced by regulation to continue offering ** H C . No matter if, depending on the particular expected profits, the monopolist then decides to offer a pooling contract for k -type low risks, there is always a Pareto-type improvement compared to the situation without the existence of black boxes (4.2). This is due to the fact that at least (1 ) k − -type low risks (or even all low risks) are disburdened of the necessity for taking only partial insurance in order to signal their risk type. This can now be directly achieved through accepting the contract with contingent accession to the black box. 35 The greater the proportion of low risks disliking the revelation of private data k and the smaller ( ) g BB , the more probable it is that the monopolist will make a higher profit with a pooling contract L P C − for both k -type and (1 ) k − -type low risks (i).
Moral Hazard under Monopoly
wealth for which the incentive compatibility constraint is binding. Hence, indifference curves which correspond to different effort levels (i.e. probabilities and therefore have different slopes) but to the same utility must intersect on this line. 
Contract with a clause for black box accession
As with adverse selection the first-best situation is achieved when a contract is offered that allows accession to the black box contingent on having an accident. Hereby the monopolist can stipulate the higher effort 
Since with asymmetric information the insureds at any rate incur a loss of utility, they will have an interest to reveal their exerted effort to the insurer. Hence, provided that the contract with accession to the black box is (technically) viable, insureds will choose it. With such a contract they will be able to achieve the first-best wealth position M C with complete insurance which maximizes their utility. In fact, the commitment to choose the higher effort is facilitated through the certain "penalty" of getting a smaller indemnity
for the case that they should have chosen the low effort and have had an accident. Thus, compared to the situation without the possibility of reviewing the black box (6.2), there clearly is a Pareto-type improvement of welfare.
Concluding remarks
Inspired by the growing technical possibilities for observing driving behavior in ever increasing detail, we examined the consequences of insurers being able to obtain perfect information on risk type or behavior by reviewing the data from a black box after an accident has occurred. As was shown in the previous sections, provided that the black box reveals perfect information, the direct outcome will be the contracts from the referential situation with symmetric information, no matter if the problem of information asymmetry is adverse selection or moral hazard, or if it persists under perfect competition or monopoly. However, it was also shown that in those cases, in which high risks formerly received an information rent (namely in the cases of adverse selection under monopoly and adverse selection under perfect competition with cross-subsidization from low to high risks), high risks are made worse off when the new technological option is introduced. In these cases the black box does not automatically lead to a Paretotype improvement of welfare. Still, even in those cases a contract with contingent accession to the black box can lead to a Pareto-type improvement if some regulation is introduced. When it ensures that high risks are not made worse off, there remain only the positive effects on social welfare from low risks receiving complete insurance.
Similarly the question of privacy loss was examined. It was shown that, as long as there are some people who don not mind the revelation of privacy, the black box will make them better off without making anyone worse off, so that there is again a Pareto-type improvement.
